conversion. 6 While significant controls still remain, there has been great progress with minimal harm to the population. 7 Foreign trade has been liberalized,8 financial markets have been created,9 the gross national product (GNP) has grown exponentially,IO ties with neighboring nations have improved,l1 and arrangements have been made for the peaceful return of Hong Kong. 12 Overholt's book is a comprehensive examination of post-1979 China from an economic perspective. It begins with a description of the transformation of China from a failed socialist-oriented control economy, comparing its progress to an array of other nations with similarly motivated modernization drives. 13 Overholt then explains Deng's strategies of countering potentially threatening opposition with sustained efforts to "use the fruits of economic productivity to [appease] major sectors of the population."14 It is not surprising that Overholt, as a banker, briefly surveys the financial institutions and mechanisms necessary to establish an economy conducive to both domestic and foreign investors' needs. 15 In addition, Overholt conducts a case study of the most prosperous region under Deng's reforms, the Guangdong Province, which is advantageously situated adjacent to Hong Kong. 16 Overholt explains Guangdong's heavy interaction with Hong Kong as well as the ramifications of the 1997 British transfer of Hong Kong back to Chinese sovereigntyP Finally, Overholt explores China's international goals and relations with other nations, particularly focusing on its relations with the United States. 18
Part I will begin with a survey of insightful observations made by Overholt based on his substantial experience with Asian issues. Over-6 OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 46. 7 For example, China's gradual policy created rapid growth while keeping inflation under a tolerable 20 percent maximum as opposed to the 91 to 2,000 percent range encountered in Poland and the Soviet Union during their respective price liberalization efforts. Id advocacy of gradual reform by an authoritarian government seems credible given the success of role models such as Taiwan or South Korea. In addition, Overholt's disdain for a rapid conversion of China to a democracy and market economy seems well placed given the negative outcome of modern Russia, the Philippines, and Latin America. 25 Deng's policy to reform China's control economy in incremental steps seems to have worked with minimal detractions. Beginning with large scale decollectivization, Deng's agricultural reform effort quickly improved economic conditions for the bulk of China's population-its 800 million peasants. 26 Deng then allowed the existence of small entrepreneurs. 27 Finally, he promoted the heart of his reform strategy: seeking foreign investment and technology as a modernization strategy to allow China to catch up quickly to its more affluent neighbors. 28 Meanwhile, political liberalization, as a natural extension of economic success, steadily progressed. Overholt suggests that China is on track to repeat the eventual evolution from an "authoritarian" regime to a democratic economic success as enjoyed by South Korea or Taiwan. 29 In the interim, Overholt urges patience from China's critics; the long-term benefits will include political liberalization and will justify toleration of China's current human rights abuses. 3o The proposition that China has forsaken geopolitical, ideological concerns and support of world insurrection in its single-minded quest for pragmatic economic success seems credible given the accompanying statisticS. 31 China's well-publicized arms sales to renegade nations rather by the changes in social structure that accompany economic reform (e.g., increased expectations, disposable income, exposure to Western culture and ideas, and decentralization of decision-making).Id. at 137-39. 30 See id. at 399-400. 31 Military expenditure was reduced from lOA percent of gross national product at the beginning of Deng's reform in 1979 to 3.7 percent in 1989. In comparison, the United States spent about 6 percent of gross national product on the military throughout the 1980s. Id. at 340. such as Iran and Syria are probably attributable more to the need for cash than to any sinister plot to destabilize the world. 32 China's notorious reputation as an arms exporter is distorted by the phenomenon that its customers buy from China only when other more modernly equipped nations will not sell. 33 Traditionally a strong champion of the "Third World movement," China has increasingly moderated its international rhetoric and efforts on behalf of these other countries. 34 Ironically, as China has deemphasized its geopolitical ambitions, its rising economic strength, accompanied by the relative decline of its neighbors, has accorded China "a geopolitical position superior to anything China has experienced in several centuries."35 This is partly due to the paradox of Asian development highlighted by Overholt: "[h]e who forgoes military ambitions gains in prosperity and power."36 However, this phenomenon is assisted by the enormity of China's size. It has already become the third largest economy in the world, and the World Bank predicts it will undoubtedly surpass the United States and Japan to become the largest. 37 34 Generally speaking, the Third World movement refers to the battle between the North and South countries, the rich versus the poor, and the developed nations against the developing nations. See id. at 332-37. China, with its communist radicalism and twenty percent of the world's population, was a significant ally of Third World "pauperism." Id. Its shift towards more pragmatic policies in 1979 decisively contributed to the declining strength of the Third World's moral, political, and economic arguments with respect to the Western developed nations. Id. at 336-37. Not only has China abandoned its support of Third World nations, but it has also abandoned its multi-faceted support of international revolutionary movements in countries such as Malaya, Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, and India. Id. at 322-23.
As China becomes more prosperous, it has begun to share more common interests with developed nations, thus leaving its ideological brethren behind. See id. at 332-37.
35Id. at 363. 36Id. at 344. This paradox has already been demonstrated by Japan, Thailand, and South Korea. China has formidably solidified its power, such that "for the first time since before the Opium War, China faces no threat to its territorial integrity or national survival," and its international influence continues to rise. Id. at 344-45. 37 Kristof, supra note 26, at 54. Given the current statistics, it is not hard to envision China eventually surpassing the United States as the world's largest economy. McRae, supra note 3, at 17. Its population is 1.2 billion, compared to the United States' 250 million, and the growth of [Vol. 15:211 Overholt's argument in opposition to recurring United States' threats to deny the renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to China for human rights violations seems sensible. Denial of MFN is such a drastic action that it would effectively expel China from the free trade system. 38 The harm to the United States economy would also be severe. 39 With such serious repercussions, Overholt believes that the United States should not keep threatening China. Overholt observes that invocation of the MFN threat by successive American presidents is more a function of domestic political posturing than a substantive policy rationale. 40 As such, it is a hollow and ill-conceived threat that Overholt thinks is insulting and unnecessarily antagonistic to a country with the size and influence of China. 41 Overholt feels it would even be counter-productive to the United States' goal of improved human rights, as it would reinforce the more conservative hardliners in China who would cite the revoking of MFN as yet another example that China should not be too open to the West. 42 The fact that only six out of 160 nations have been subjected to MFN revocation is indicative of its extremely rare use. 43
II. PROBLEMATIC FACETS OF DEVELOPMENT
Overholt takes such a positive view of China's successes and economic efforts that important concerns are either down played or igits GNP has averaged ten percent per annum for the last ten years, compared to the United States at three percent. Id. The World Bank estimated that Greater China (an area that includes China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) will have a gross domestic product of $9.8 trillion in 2002, compared to $9.7 trillion for the United States in the same year. Kristof, supra note 26, at 54. 38 OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 391-92. Overholt believes the repercussions would not be serious for most of China because so much of it is not dependent on foreign exports. See id. It would be primarily the export-oriented regions such as the Guangdong and Fujian Provinces that would be especially hit hard. See id. Additionally, losses might be greatest in dependent Hong Kong (estimated to be $2,000 for each of its six million residents), and Taiwan, due to its utilization of China as a manufacturing platform. Id. at 392. In the period between 1979 and 1992, Hong Kong and Taiwan accounted for 57 percent of the foreign investment in the Guangdong Province, with 11 percent from Japan and 9 percent from the United States. able economic and scientific progress for the country as a whole. 52 These abstract demands for democracy were rooted in widespread disenchantment with the structure of the current economic reforms. 53 Three primary issues were at the core of the students' complaints: 1) the ability to choose their jobs rather than following government dictates, 2) the widespread corruption and nepotism of government and party bureaucrats, and 3) the high rate of inflation that seriously eroded buying power. 54 Overholt acknowledges the existence of these serious problems but does not seem to place as much emphasis on their resolution as do the Chinese people. In addition, the Chinese government's repressive response at Tiananmen signified the Chinese leadership's belief that:
economic reforms could be completely divorced from the immensely complex social and cultural effects that the reforms brought in their train ...
[threatening] to commit the government again to the nineteenth-century fallacy that China could join the modern world entirely on its own terms, sacrificing nothing of its prevailing ideological purity. 55
Five years after Tiananmen, the structural problems that sparked it still continue and arguably have worsened. Job opportunities are uneven and regionally determined, corruption and nepotism have worsened, and inflationary cycles continue to persist. 56 The rural and urban disparity continues as the country lacks the investment to correct the imbalance. 57 The future prospect of massive unemployment appears unavoidable as Deng must eventually overhaul the extremely inefficient state operations which account for 150 million redundant workers and the 50 million more anticipated by the end of the century.58 Corruption, kickbacks and graft have spread to officials at all levels to such an extent that foreign businesses recognize it to be a standard cost of doing business in China. 63 Partly due to their influence and also due to the central government's inability to control the various provincial governments, China is unable to impose fiscal and monetary discipline in a consistent manner.54 Thus, the cycles of inflation continue, the budget deficit grows exponentially, and capital flight worsens. 65 While Overholt recognizes the harmfulness of these sobering trends, he seems to downplay their effect more than other experts. He disputes the 200 million underemployed or unemployed figure as unreliable and presents a different view to explain the numbers.66 He acknowledges that the inefficient state sector accounts for huge deficits, but advocates only gradual privatization because he believes that the disruption that would undoubtedly accompany an abrupt conversion would be much worse. 67 He down plays the effects associated with the cycles of inflation. 68 Regarding the influence of the "princel- and protectionism foster large bureaucracies that are actually disguised unemployment because each firm becomes a miniature welfare state. Id. He states that Deng's reforms are ironic in that they have exposed and focused negative attention on this disguised unemployment, but at the same time the growing economy has accounted for an increase in employment coupled with a higher standard of living. Id. 67 Id. at 64.
68 ings" and the general atmosphere of corruption, Overholt believes that it is simply a phase that will pass. 69 Overholt continues to profess that China will eventually become democratic despite the lack of active efforts by the Chinese government to make this a reality.70 Given China's relatively large size, Overholt's theory of eventual political liberalization akin to Taiwan or South Korea appears misguided. 71 Even after Tiananmen demonstrated the Communist Party's clear willingness to use force to preserve its power, Overholt continues to maintain that the Communist Party is only a temporary, albeit necessary, phenomenon. 72
Overholt's comparison of China to smaller Asian countries such as Taiwan or South Korea also proves inadequate when assessing the viability of economic reforms. Most small Asian countries, including Japan, achieved economic success with military or historical links to either the United States or Britain. 73 This protective security was complemented by an export strategy to the waiting markets of their receptive benefactors. 74 There are three primary bases for distinguishing China. First, the Chinese economy is so immense that other countries cannot absorb the amount of potential goods that it could produce; thus, its "economic expansion will have to be internally driven, and will almost certainly move more slowly as a result. "75 Second, since strategic reasons motivated the West's prior boosting of other Asian nations, Western markets are certainly not as receptive to an "independent" China's products or its unfair trade practices. 76 Third, while 69Id. at 80-81. Overholt further contends that other economically successful Asian nations, such as South Korea and Taiwan, passed this phase and that market economic efficiency theory dictates that corruption cannot go on indefinitely. Id. He believes China's "princelings" are not nearly as bad as the friends and relatives of the Marcos family or the Suharto family, in the Philippines and Indonesia respectively, each of which had gained family monopolies of their nation's major enterprises. See id. at 81.
70 See id. at 399-400.
71 It is not difficult to see that in a country of 1.2 billion people, the demonstrations of thousands of students in Beijing would affect the rest of China relatively less than a similar student demonstration in Seoul might affect the rest of Korea with its population of only 43 million. See McRae, supra note 3, at 17. In South Korea, demonstrations have occurred consistently since 1960, resulting in the government's eventual democratization. However, the Chinese government has quickly crushed major demonstrations and restricted information disseminated to the outer provinces. See SPENCE, supra note 1, at 743 (noting in the wake of Tiananmen, the government quickly cut off the flow of information, both domestically and internationally Similarly, Overholt enjoys comparing and upholding the superiority of China's reform efforts to the Gorbachev-type reforms in the Soviet Union or the "big bang" approach taken in post-communist Eastern Europe. 78 Such a comparison is premature and fails to highlight important differences between these nations. Gorbachev, as Overholt implies, never had Deng's institutional support, control, or credibility.79 Unlike China, the Soviet Union was primarilyurban.80 Although Gorbachev failed with agricultural initiatives, it was actually his inability to reform the massive state industries that led to his undoing. 81 Desperation drove him to attempt political liberalization before fundamental economic reform. 82 Meanwhile in China, Deng's successful reform of the countryside appeased 800 million of China's 1.2 billion people. 83 Contrary to conventional wisdom, China still has not undertaken the reform of the massive and inefficient state industries that led to Gorbachev's undoing. 84 Therefore, despite Overholt's repeated praise for China's efforts, perhaps his praise should be reserved until China successfully undertakes major structural reform. Meanwhile, in order to stay operational, China's state enterprises continue to require large governmental subsidies. 85 NEW SUPERPOWER (1993». China will need other countries to be receptive to its products. This means that it will have to balance its objectives with reasonable demands of other nations. Charles Powell, The Next Great Marketplace? Charles Powell on the Implications of China's Booming Economy, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 16, 1994, at 11 (reviewing 29, 34 (1994) . Such a disparity indicated severe under-employment.
Although losses that these enterprises absorb are hidden and understated, the general consensus A final criticism of Overholt's book focuses on his assertion that the emerging winners of a post-Deng succession struggle for leadership would be authoritarian modernizers (such as the followers of Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang) ,86 rather than the bureaucratic socialists led by current Premier Li Ping and President Jiang Zemin, Deng's designated successor.87 To most observers, however, this result is not as clear as Overholt implies. 88 Not only is the Zhao faction currently in official disrepute and the Li faction unpopular with the people due to their role in the Tiananmen Square crackdown, but there remain two figures from Deng's generation who exude tremendous influence. 89 If the currently favored Li or Jiang gain control, they will continue reforms but it will be at a slower pace than Zhao or even Deng would prefer. 90 Considering Li's role in crushing the Tiananmen demonstrations, his control would probably delay the achievement of the political freedoms that Overholt predicted. Moreover, there is always the probability that the Maoist radicals that caused the destructive Cultural Revolution could regain some modicum of influence, despite Overholt's cursory dismissals to the contrary.
III. CONCLUSION
Overholt has written an enormously well-contemplated and interesting account of the rise of modern China. He makes insightful observations that capture many relevant aspects of the fifteen-year period of Deng's ambitious reforms. He demonstrates an almost intuiis that one-third of China's 10,000 state companies were profitable, one-third were border-line insolvent, and one-third suffered from large hidden losses. Id. 
See id.
tive ability to decipher the critical phases of China's reform, both domestically and as it affects the international community. His section outlining the macro-economic requirements for reform such as the development of capital markets is informative for readers who may lack his banking background. The recounting of key details of the transfer of Hong Kong and the post-agreement political posturing by both the British and Chinese gives the reader an "insider view" of the process. His summation with an overview of United States-China relations echoes the book's pervasive message that China has indeed become a world force to be reckoned with on equal terms.
However, some of Overholt's observations are phrased in such a pro-China tone that they do not give an otherwise uninformed reader an objective view of China's reforms. The topic that Overholt addresses is so complex that it invariably requires heavy editing to distill it to an understandable medium. Perhaps due to this effort to condense and convey the subject matter, Overholt makes some rather broad assertions and weak analogies that are at best misleading, and at worst inaccurate. While Overholt remains extremely optimistic about the future course of China's economic modernization goals and eventual political reform, most expert observers are far more cautious. Then again, Overholt has an unblemished track record for making bold predictions that are contrary to conventional wisdom. Nevertheless, Overholt's account of China's reforms probably should be read with a more critical eye toward China than is presented by the author, in the event that his rosy predictions do not materialize.
